۔مزید آپریشن جبرالٹر اور دوسری جنگ بندی – JK17
پچھلی قسط میں آپریشن جبرالٹر کے متعلق جموں کشمیر کے لوگوں کے خیالات مختصر طور پر سپرد قلم کئے تھے ۔ اب واقف حال اور ماہرین کی تحریروں سے اقتباسات ۔
Following are excerpt of the book Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, The Army, And America's War On Terror, written by Hassan Abbas, a former police officer from Pakistan and currently a Research fellow at the Harvard Law School and a Ph. D candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University:
“When the Pakistan Army inflicted a short, sharp reverse on the Indians in the Rann of Kutch in mid-1965, Ayub’s spirits got a boost.
Bhutto, in his letter to Ayub of May 12, 1965, drew his attention to increasing Western military aid to India and how fast the balance of power in the region was shifting in India’s favor as a result. He expanded on this theme and recommended that “a bold and courageous stand” would “open up greater possibility for a negotiated settlement.”
Ayub Khan was won over by the force of this logic, and he tasked the Kashmir Cell under Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmed, to draw up plans to stir up some trouble in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir, which could then be exploited in Pakistan’s favor by limited military involvement.
The Kashmir Cell was a nondescript body working without direction and producing no results. It laid the broad concept of Operation Gibraltar, but did not get very far beyond this in terms of coming up with anything concrete. When Ayub saw that the Kashmir Cell was making painfully little headway in translating his directions into a plan of action, he personally handed responsibility for the operation over to Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, commander of the 12th Division of the Pakistan Army. This division was responsible for the defense of the entire length of the Cease-fire Line (CLF) in the Kashmir region.
The plan of this operation (Gibraltar) as finalized by General Akhtar Malik and approved by Ayub Khan was to infiltrate a sizable armed force across the CFL into Indian Kashmir.
Later, grand slam was to be launched. This was to be a quick strike by armored and infantry forces from the southern tip of the CFL to Akhnur, a town astride the Jammu-Srinagar Road. This would cut the main Indian artery into the Kashmir valley, bottle up the Indian forces there, and so open up a number of options that could then be exploited as the situation demanded.
Having no reserves for this purpose, General Akhtar Malik decided that the only option for him was to simultaneously train a force of Azad Kashmiri irregulars (mujahids) for this purpose.
Operation Gibraltar was launched in the first week of August 1965, and all the infiltrators made it across the CFL without a single case of detection by the Indians. The pro-Pakistan elements in Kashmir had not been taken into confidence prior to this operation, and there was no help forthcoming for the infiltrators in most areas.
Overall, despite lack of support from the local population, the operation managed to cause anxiety to the Indians, at times verging on panic. On August 8 the Kashmir government recommended that martial law be imposed in Kashmir. It seemed that the right time to launch operation Grand Slam was when such anxiety was at its height. But it was General Akhtar Malik’s opinion that this be delayed till the Indians had committed their reserves to seal off the infiltration routes, which he felt was certain to happen eventually.
On August 24, India concentrated its forces to launch its operations in order to seal off Haji Pir Pass, through which lay the main infiltration routes.
By early afternoon of the first day (September 01, 1965) all the objectives were taken, the Indian forces were on the run, and Akhnur lay tantalizingly close and inadequately defended. “At this point, someone’s prayers worked” says Indian journalist, MJ Akbar: “An inexplicable change of command took place.”
Loss of time is inherent in any such change . . . . And this was enough for the Indians to bolster the defenses of Akhnur and launch their strike against Lahore across the international frontier between the two countries. This came on September 6 while the Pakistani forces were still three miles short of Akhnur.
پرانے زمانہ کے ایک بریگیڈیئر جاوید حسین کے مضمون سے اقتباس
When the Special Service Group (SSG), the army’s unit that specializes in special operations, was taken into confidence, they pointed out that the Kashmiri Muslims would cooperate only when they were assured of protection against the inevitable Indian retribution. However, when it became clear that the planners’ belief in their plan had blinded them to the faults in it, the SSG warned, them in writing that the operation as planned would turn out to be Pakistan’s Bay of Pigs.
On the night of August 5/6 1965, 5,000 lightly armed men slipped across the ceasefire line into occupied Kashmir from multiple points. They were the hastily recruited and trained Azad Kashmir civilians with a sprinkling of Azad Kashmir and Pakistani soldiers. They were the Gibraltar Force. In the early stages of the operation, while the surprise lasted, they conducted a series of spectacular raids and ambushes, which caused great alarm and trepidation in the Indian high command. Then the expected happened.
Indian retribution against Muslim villages was swift and brutal; as a result, the locals not only refused to cooperate with the raiders but also started to assist the Indian forces to flush them out. Suddenly, from hunters the raiders had become the hunted. To make matters worse, the Indian forces went on the offensive capturing Kargil, Haji Pir pass and Tithwal and threatening Muzaffarabad.
With its fate sealed, the Gibraltar force disintegrated within three weeks of the launch and its few survivors limped back to Azad Kashmir hungry, tired and defeated. Phase-I of the field marshal’s plan had backfired.
جنرل عتیق الرحمان نے اپنی کتاب بیک ٹو پیولین میں ستمبر 1965 کی جنگ کے متعلق لکھا ہے ۔ جب پاکستانی فوج نےکئی محاذوں پر بھارتی فوج کو پسپائی پر مجبور کر دیا ۔ لاہور محاذ سے بھارتی فوج بیاس جانے کی منصوبہ بندی کر چکی تھی اور سیالکوٹ محاذ پر بھارتی سینا بعض مقامات پر کئی کئی میل پیچھے دھکیل دی گئی تھی ۔ ان خالی جگہوں کے راستے پاکستانی فوج نے بھرپور جوابی حملے کی منصوبہ بندی کر لی ۔ جوابی حملہ کی تیاریاں کر رہے تھے کہ عین اس وقت جنگ بندی کرا دی گئی ۔ یہ جنگ بندی امریکہ اور روس کے دباؤ کے تحت ہوئی تھی ۔
جنرل عتیق کی کتاب کے کچھ اقتباسات آپ معین باری کے لکھے ہوئے ایک جرنیل کا اعتراف گناہ میں پڑھ سکتے ہیں ۔ پہلی قسط کے لئے یہاں کلک کیجئے اور دوسری قسط کے لئے یہاں کلک کیجئے ۔
باقی انشاء اللہ آئیندہ
Following are excerpt of the book Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, The Army, And America's War On Terror, written by Hassan Abbas, a former police officer from Pakistan and currently a Research fellow at the Harvard Law School and a Ph. D candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University:
“When the Pakistan Army inflicted a short, sharp reverse on the Indians in the Rann of Kutch in mid-1965, Ayub’s spirits got a boost.
Bhutto, in his letter to Ayub of May 12, 1965, drew his attention to increasing Western military aid to India and how fast the balance of power in the region was shifting in India’s favor as a result. He expanded on this theme and recommended that “a bold and courageous stand” would “open up greater possibility for a negotiated settlement.”
Ayub Khan was won over by the force of this logic, and he tasked the Kashmir Cell under Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmed, to draw up plans to stir up some trouble in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir, which could then be exploited in Pakistan’s favor by limited military involvement.
The Kashmir Cell was a nondescript body working without direction and producing no results. It laid the broad concept of Operation Gibraltar, but did not get very far beyond this in terms of coming up with anything concrete. When Ayub saw that the Kashmir Cell was making painfully little headway in translating his directions into a plan of action, he personally handed responsibility for the operation over to Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, commander of the 12th Division of the Pakistan Army. This division was responsible for the defense of the entire length of the Cease-fire Line (CLF) in the Kashmir region.
The plan of this operation (Gibraltar) as finalized by General Akhtar Malik and approved by Ayub Khan was to infiltrate a sizable armed force across the CFL into Indian Kashmir.
Later, grand slam was to be launched. This was to be a quick strike by armored and infantry forces from the southern tip of the CFL to Akhnur, a town astride the Jammu-Srinagar Road. This would cut the main Indian artery into the Kashmir valley, bottle up the Indian forces there, and so open up a number of options that could then be exploited as the situation demanded.
Having no reserves for this purpose, General Akhtar Malik decided that the only option for him was to simultaneously train a force of Azad Kashmiri irregulars (mujahids) for this purpose.
Operation Gibraltar was launched in the first week of August 1965, and all the infiltrators made it across the CFL without a single case of detection by the Indians. The pro-Pakistan elements in Kashmir had not been taken into confidence prior to this operation, and there was no help forthcoming for the infiltrators in most areas.
Overall, despite lack of support from the local population, the operation managed to cause anxiety to the Indians, at times verging on panic. On August 8 the Kashmir government recommended that martial law be imposed in Kashmir. It seemed that the right time to launch operation Grand Slam was when such anxiety was at its height. But it was General Akhtar Malik’s opinion that this be delayed till the Indians had committed their reserves to seal off the infiltration routes, which he felt was certain to happen eventually.
On August 24, India concentrated its forces to launch its operations in order to seal off Haji Pir Pass, through which lay the main infiltration routes.
By early afternoon of the first day (September 01, 1965) all the objectives were taken, the Indian forces were on the run, and Akhnur lay tantalizingly close and inadequately defended. “At this point, someone’s prayers worked” says Indian journalist, MJ Akbar: “An inexplicable change of command took place.”
Loss of time is inherent in any such change . . . . And this was enough for the Indians to bolster the defenses of Akhnur and launch their strike against Lahore across the international frontier between the two countries. This came on September 6 while the Pakistani forces were still three miles short of Akhnur.
پرانے زمانہ کے ایک بریگیڈیئر جاوید حسین کے مضمون سے اقتباس
When the Special Service Group (SSG), the army’s unit that specializes in special operations, was taken into confidence, they pointed out that the Kashmiri Muslims would cooperate only when they were assured of protection against the inevitable Indian retribution. However, when it became clear that the planners’ belief in their plan had blinded them to the faults in it, the SSG warned, them in writing that the operation as planned would turn out to be Pakistan’s Bay of Pigs.
On the night of August 5/6 1965, 5,000 lightly armed men slipped across the ceasefire line into occupied Kashmir from multiple points. They were the hastily recruited and trained Azad Kashmir civilians with a sprinkling of Azad Kashmir and Pakistani soldiers. They were the Gibraltar Force. In the early stages of the operation, while the surprise lasted, they conducted a series of spectacular raids and ambushes, which caused great alarm and trepidation in the Indian high command. Then the expected happened.
Indian retribution against Muslim villages was swift and brutal; as a result, the locals not only refused to cooperate with the raiders but also started to assist the Indian forces to flush them out. Suddenly, from hunters the raiders had become the hunted. To make matters worse, the Indian forces went on the offensive capturing Kargil, Haji Pir pass and Tithwal and threatening Muzaffarabad.
With its fate sealed, the Gibraltar force disintegrated within three weeks of the launch and its few survivors limped back to Azad Kashmir hungry, tired and defeated. Phase-I of the field marshal’s plan had backfired.
جنرل عتیق الرحمان نے اپنی کتاب بیک ٹو پیولین میں ستمبر 1965 کی جنگ کے متعلق لکھا ہے ۔ جب پاکستانی فوج نےکئی محاذوں پر بھارتی فوج کو پسپائی پر مجبور کر دیا ۔ لاہور محاذ سے بھارتی فوج بیاس جانے کی منصوبہ بندی کر چکی تھی اور سیالکوٹ محاذ پر بھارتی سینا بعض مقامات پر کئی کئی میل پیچھے دھکیل دی گئی تھی ۔ ان خالی جگہوں کے راستے پاکستانی فوج نے بھرپور جوابی حملے کی منصوبہ بندی کر لی ۔ جوابی حملہ کی تیاریاں کر رہے تھے کہ عین اس وقت جنگ بندی کرا دی گئی ۔ یہ جنگ بندی امریکہ اور روس کے دباؤ کے تحت ہوئی تھی ۔
جنرل عتیق کی کتاب کے کچھ اقتباسات آپ معین باری کے لکھے ہوئے ایک جرنیل کا اعتراف گناہ میں پڑھ سکتے ہیں ۔ پہلی قسط کے لئے یہاں کلک کیجئے اور دوسری قسط کے لئے یہاں کلک کیجئے ۔
باقی انشاء اللہ آئیندہ
posted by افتخار اجمل بھوپال @ 7:10 am
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